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Preface
It is known only too well that the new security environment in Europe after the cold war has led to
an overall revision of defence expenditures in all the member states of NAIO and WEU.
In November 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept calling for highly-mobile, multinational
and flexible forces to replace the former linear defence forces. Only a few months later, in June 1992, the
WEU Ministerial Council issued the Petersberg declaration including a chapter on strengthening WEU's
operational r6le. WEU member states declared that they were prepared to make available military units
from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the autho-
rity of WEU. It was also said that military units would be organised on a multinational and multiservice
basis and that WEU member states intended to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable
the deployment of such units in accomplishing specific tasks.
Since then, many initiatives have been taken, both in NATO and WEU, to implement the decisions
mentioned above and the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly considered it appropriate to present
a concise inventory of what has been accomplished in the area of bilateral or multilateral forces. Admit-
tedly, some of the forces mentioned in the present report existed before the 1990s, but they also had to be
adapted to the new strategic environment and find their place in new structures.
One chapter in the present report discusses the stage reached in the implementation of the combinedjoint task forces concept (CJTF) since its adoption at the January 1994 NATO summit meeting.
Originally, the committee had also intended to examine recent developments in defence budgets
and armed forces of the individual WEU member states, but your Rapporteur, much to his regret, has not
been able to accomplish all the necessary preparations for such a survey which proved to be more deman-
ding than foreseen. It is hoped, however, that it will be possible to make this survey on another occasion.
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Draft Recommendnti.on
on Europ ean arme d forc e s
The Assembly,
@ Noting the NATO Council's declared full support for the development of a European security and
defence identity and the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through WEU;
(iil Noting that, according to the NATO Council's decision, the alliance's organisation and resources
will be adjusted so as to facilitate this process;
(iiil Believing, however, that in more than eighteen months since the endorsement of the CJTF concept
at NAIO's summit meeting in January l994,no significant progress has been made in the implementation
of this concepto even though it is almost a year ago now, on 29th June 1994, that WEU presented to NATO
its report on criteria and modalities for the effective use of the CJTF;
(iv) Noting that there is an ever more urgent need for WEU to identiff clearly those assets and capabi-
lities which WEU will need in possible future operations and to define its views on ways and means for
the use of such assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU;
(v) Recognising and calLing upon the Council to demonstrate its own recognition that WEU member
states will have to procure, through multinational co-operative programmes, those assets and capabilities
which the alliance cannot make available to WEU;
(vi) Emphasising that the European allies cannot afford to delay the establishment of appropriate
operational capabilities and command structures for whatever European contingency operations in which
NATO may choose not to act;
(vii) Welcoming the decisions taken at the WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 15th May 1995
regarding the development of WEU operational capabilities;
(viii) Taking note of the increasing reluctance of the United States to commit ground ffoops to any
operation on European soil which is not based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(ix) Recognising that on either side of the Atlantic there might be different perceptions of the threats to
European security and the political and military means to handle them;
(x) Welcoming the fact that, with the approval of a document identifying their common interests as well
as potential risks to European security, the 27 WEU nations have taken the first steps towards joint think-
ing on the new European security conditions which should result in the publication of a white paper on
European security;
(xi) Welcoming the recent decision by France, Italy and Spain to establish a land force @UROFOR) and
a maritime force @UROMARFOR) in both of which Portugal will participate and which will be declared
forces answerable to WEU;
(xii) Somewhat surprised that, whenever European multinational forces are established, NAIO insists on
its right to use them, while at the same time it seems increasingly reluctant to mount operations in the new
type of post-cold war contingencies which are threatening Europe's security;
Welcoming the decision to establish the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n as a permanent WEU
(xiv) In doubt whether the establishment in the near future of a WEU humanitarian intervention force
would be an adequate solution for the hazardous and often hostile environments in which such a force
would have to operate both on European soil and elsewhere in the world;
(m) Considering that the United Nations' lack of an appropriate command, conffol, communications
and intelligence structure calls into question its ability to command humanitarian, peace-keeping orpeace-
enforcing operations which are taking place in hazardous circumstances;
(ni) Expressing the wish that the WEU Permanent Council's examination of peace-keeping and conflict
prevention, combined with the initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom, will produce early and
tangible results;
(xiii)
body;
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(mii) 
^Emphasising tlrt recent developments in the Bosnian conflict have clearly demonstrated the urgentneed for exclusively European rapid reaction forces for all WEU operations mentioned in the PetersSerg
declaration;
(rviii).Notilg that geostrategic de-velopments and reductions in the means European states are allocating
to their defence are encouraging them to opt increasingly for multinational co-operation but that such col
operation is haphazard,
RscoNfivENDs rHAr um Cotxcu.
1. Invite WEU member states to stop reducing their defence expenditure;
2. Organise a summit meeting of heads of state and of government of WEU member countries in the
fust half of 1996 at the latest to examine European securityand more particularly the need to co-ordinate
means, policies and multinational co-operation in order to organise effective joint defence;
3. Devote its every effort to urge NAIO to implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995;
4. However this qa.y be, by the-end of 1995 at the latest, identify clearly those assets and capabilities
which WEU will need in possible future operations and, in addition, as mentioned in the Lisbo-n declar-
ation, define views on ways and means of using such assets and capabilities which the alliance should
make available to WEU;
5.- 
. - 
In paraltel, identify those assets and capabilities which WEU should possess in its own right and
which its member states will have to procure urgently through multinational io-operative prograrnmes or
othenwise;
6. Promote forthwith the establishment of permanent exclusively European rapid reaction forces,
includingheadquarters and political-military command structures, foiall WEU operhtions mentioned in
the Petersberg declaration;
7. Refrain from accepting, or appearing to accept, further obligations or commitments where there is
a lack of capacity or a will to fulfil them.
DrcUlt/ffi\"r 1468
Explanatory Memorandam
(subminedby Mn De Decker, Ropporteur)
I. The European Corps
l. On 14th October 1991, President Frangois
Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who in
1987 started to create a French-German brigade
which has been operational since October 1991,
informed the President of the European Council,
at that time the Prime Minister of the Netherlands,
Ruud Lubbers, of their intention to create an
anny to which other member states of WEU
could contribute. The official decision to create
the European Corps was taken at the French-
German summit meeting at La Rochelle on 22nd
May L992 with the adoption of the " joint
report concerning the creation of the European
Corps ".
2. In July 1992, a provisional staff was crea-
ted in Srasbourg with the task of setting-up the
staff of the European Corps, which became fully
operational on lst July 1994. General-Lieutenant
I{elmut Willmann from Germany, who took office
on lst October 1993, marking the ofFrcial creation
of the European Corps, was nominated as the frst
General to command the European Corps.
(a) Membenhip
3. The European Corps is currently drawn
from five member states: Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Luxembourg and Spain. The Belgian
Council of Ministers decided to request participa-
tion in the Franco-German corps on 22nd June
1993 and Belgium's official accession to the
European Corps took place on 25th June 1993.
The official Spanish accession was on lst July
1994 and in June 1994 Luxembourg announced
that it would like to join the European Corps.
Although all member states of WEU have been
invited to join the European Corps, it is thought
that - if only for practical reasons - it should not be
enlarged beyond is present composition. It is now
generally agreed that if more nations are interest-
ed in participating, consideration should be given
to the possible creation of a second European
Corps.
(h) Relationswirh NATO
4. After the creation of the European Corps,
based on their earlier understanding of December
1992. T}lre French Chief-of-staff, Admiml Jacques
Lanxade, and the German Chief-of-staff, General
Klaus Naumann, signed an agreement with
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
General John M. Shalikashvili, on 2lst January
1993, on the use of the European Corps. Belgium
signed the SACELJR agreements on l2th October
1993. According to this agreement" the corps may
be used by NAf,O either as a main defence force
in Central Europe or as a rapid reaction peace-
keeping or peace-making force in the European
theatre, covered by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation. Relations between the European
Corps and NATO are based on the specific nature
of tfus new multinational European formation,
which the participants wished to maintain.
Moreover, it should be noted that the European
Corps is adapted to the structures and procedures
of the alliance, thus confirming it as compatible
with NAIO and as France's contribution (in that
context) to the strengthening of the European
pillar in NATO. As a consequence, in the event of
a crisis and under specific circumstances, French
troops could be placed under the operational com-
mand of NATO. However, such engagement of
French troops could take place, after approval by
the French authorities, for specific and preliminary-
defined missions. In such a case, France would be
prepared to participate in the debates of the Mili-
tary Committee together with the other member
states of the European Corps.
(c) Relntions with WEU
5. The European Corps was also created with
a view to reinforcing the European defence iden-
tity, and the forces of the European Corps have
been designated as forces answerable to WEU
(FAWEU) at the WEU Council's meeting held in
Rome on 19th May 1993. The conditions for
WEU's employment of the European Corps were
then agreed on 20th September 1993 in the " joint
declaration stating the conditions for the use of
the European Corps in the framework of Western
European Union ". The joint declaration states
that the corps could be subordinated, after a deci-
sion of the Council for use, to a command design-
ated by WEU, for which the participating states
will set up a joint committee for internal co-ordi-
nation. The European Corps can be deployed for
all the tasks specified in the Petersberg declara-
tion and its use by WEU would be based on plans
formulated by the operation commander design-
ated by WEU, in co-operation with the WEU
Planning Cell.
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(tl) Missions
6. The European Corps itself has fust call on
the units allocated to it intended for joint oper-
ations. The joint decision to deploy the European
Corps, remains the responsibitity of the particip-
ating governments. The Joint Committee in charge
of carrying out the governments' decisions
defines the method and procedures for the deploy-
ment and transfer of command of the European
Corps for each mission.
7. The missions of the European Corps are the
corunon defence of the allied territory in applica-
tion of Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington or
Article V of the Brussels Treaty. It can also be
deployed for peace-restoring and peace-keeping
missions, humanitarian and rescue tasks, and
tasks of combat forces in crisis-management, mis-
sions mentioned in the Petersberg declaration.
Furthermore, the European Corps is to serve as
the central core structure for European armed
forceso to constitute an instrument for the com-
mon foreign and security potcy and a means of
reinforcing the European pillar within NATO.
(e) Compositian
8. The first unit assigned to the European
Corps was the Franco-German brigade of 5 250
men, operational since 1991, with headquarters in
Miillheim. The other national contributions are:
- 
France: the lst armoured division with
headquarters in Baden-Baden;
- 
Germany: the 10th armoured division
with headquarters in Sigmaringen, com-
posed of the 12th armoured brigade and
the 30th mechanised brigade;
- 
Belgium: the lst mechanised division
with headquarters in Saive, consisting of
the lst, the 7th and the 17th mechanised
brigades;
- 
Spain: the 21st mechanised brigade
based in Cord6ba which will join the
European Corps in 1995. The Spanish
contribution will be completed to a full
mechanised division in 1998.
9. Luxembourg intends to integrate a recon-
naissance company into ttre Belgian lst mechanised
brigade.
10. The total strength of the European Corps is
presently 50 800 men, spread over the member
states as follows:
Belgium
(f) Ttainins
11. The frst exercise of the European Corps(Pegasus) was held from 7th-17th November
1994 with about 5 000 soldiers from all the parti-
cipating states, practising interoperabitty of the
corps staff and troops. Pegasus was based on
counter-concentration, requiring quick movement
of large units over long distances. The ultimate
goal of the exercise was deep integration at a high
operational level. The exercise has demonstrated
that the objective of being operational on
lst October 1995 is feasible.
(g) Problzns still ta be resolved
12. The creation of the European Corps has
caused a number of problems, all of which have
not yet been solved satisfactorily. The most
worrying is the absence of a juridical and institu-
tional statute for the headquarters. At the moment,
transposed NATO texts are used. The present
situation affects the operational capability of the
Ewopean Corps and is leading many observers to
wonder whether political willingness will be
enough. An even greater problem is the require-
ment for unanimity on every decision taken in thejoint committee. Furthermore, there are difficul-
ties with the heterogeneity of equipment, the lack
of appropriate independent logistics, mobility and
appropriate mission training, military airlift capa-
bility and military transport capacity. In particu-
lar, for logistics, communication systems and air
transport capacity, the European Corps is still too
dependent on the United States.
13. Although it is still in the process of being
established, the European Corps has already ful-
filled one important task of its mission: it has
shown that the resilient and flexible working
arrangements between NATO and WEU are
capable of extension and expansion.
II. EUROFOR - EUROMARFOR
14. Initially, as discussed at the 20th November
1992 ministerial meeting in Rome, the idea had
been to create a trilateral, non-permanent, air-
maritime force eventually to be extended with an
amphibious capability. At the meeting in Luxem-
bourg on 22nd November 1993, ministers " wel-
comed and agreed to study the Italian initiative
envisaging a multinational groundforce aimed at
enhancing the operational significance of the air-
maritime initiative ". This ground force would be
able to act alone or co-operate with the air-mari-
time force. At their meeting in Noordwijk
(14th November 1994),WEU ministers discussed
the progress made by France,Italy and Spain and
asked them to present these forces at their minis-
terial meeting in the spring of 1995.
France
Gennany
Spain .........
Franco-German Brigade
9 600
10 300
18 s00
4 500
5 250
7
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15. AtaWEU ministerialmeeting on l5thMay
1995, France, Italy and Spain signed the founding
documents for the creation of an army joint rapid
reaction force @UROFOR) and a European mari-
time force (EUROMARFOR) to provide extra
security for the Mediterranean at a time of mount-
ing concern over the security situation in the
southern Mediterranean.
16. Also on l5th May, Portugal offtcially made
its request to participate in the two forces. Spain,
France and Italy have now agreed to Portugal's
participation from the beginning of the establish-
ment of these forces. The United Kingdom has
already shownits interest in EUROMARFOR and
its possible association in the future is not ruled out.
(a) Goals andmissians
17. According to a joint communiqu6 issued by
France, Spain and ltaly, the EUROFOR and
EUROMARFOR initiatives are meant to conffi-
bute to the creation of a military capability for
Europe, notably in the freld of force projection;
create a multinational base structure for member
states of WEU that wish to participate in its oper-
ations; contribute, while respecting the content of
the Petersberg declaration, to initiatives of inter-
national organisations, to promote and maintain
peace and security.
18. ELJROFOR is a large multinational land
force of up to a division in shength. It has a rapid
reaction capability, easy deployment and can act
on its own or together with EUROMARFOR. It
will have no permanently-attached units but
consists of pre-assigned professional elite units,
which are available at short notice.
19. EUROMARFOR is a pre-structured, non-
permanent multinational maritime force, with
aeronaval and amphibious forces, capable of
acting on their own or together with EUROFOR.
The composition and structure of the EURO-
MARFOR will depend on the missions to be per-
formed. A typical composition for certain tasks
could be an aircraft-carier with four to six escort
units, a landing force, amphibious forces and a
supply ship. EUROMARFOR will have no per-
manent structures nor a pennanent headquarters
but will come under rotating command of the par-
ticipating states. Warships under WEU will be led
by a French aircraft-canier. [n each of the partici-
pating states, marines will be designated to prepare
a possible operation and will colordinate with
their counterparts. Although some of the prob-
lems over how to finance the operations are still to
be solved, the two forces will be established as of
autumn 1995.
20. The missions for EUROFOR and EURO-
MARFOR correspond to those set out in the
Petersberg declaration: humanitarian and rescue
tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks ofcombat forces
in crisis-management, including peace-making. It
is noted, however, that the fulfilment of these
tasks must not involve the participation of these
forces in defence missions in the sense of Article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or Article V of the
modified Brussels Treaty.
(b) Relations with NATO andWEU
21. For the use of these forces in a trilateral
framework, a common decision of the participar
ing states is needed. Their use within the frame-
work of WEU has priority, but they could also be
used in the framework of NATO. In preliminary
WEU discussions, the United Kingdom had in
sisted on the two forces being equally available to
NAIO and WEU, although WEU would have first
priority. The British view was endorsed by Italy,
which also wishes to avoid any weakening of
NATO. As a consequence, NATO would have
first call on the new forces should the territory of
the alliance be threatened or attacked.
22. An agreement is being prepared on the
conditions for the use of these forces in WEU
with a view to WEU's r6le as the defence compo-
nent of the European Union and as a reinforced
pillar of NATO. It is noted that EUROFOR and
EUROMARFOR will be declared forces answer-
able to WEU (EAWEU). A high-level interminis-
terial committee will assure politico-military co-
ordination, establish the conditions for use and
provide directives for the command of these two
forces. The Pennanent Council was charged to
specify the relations between WEU and these
forces. The two forces are intended to comple-
ment the European Corps in is promotion of the
operational r6le of WEU.
23. France has already suggested creating mul-
tinational and multiservice European intervention
forces, under the command of a European general
staff.
(c) Structure
24. EUROFOR will have a perrnanent com-
mand with amultinational headquarters in Florence
and the capability to perforrn joint operations. It is
expected to have about 5 000 troops with the pos-
sibility of being expanded to 10 000. It will be
higtly mobile and capable of long distance oper-
ations. Procedures will be prepared for WEU to
use the rapid reaction force. The four participating
nations plan to contribute infantry and light
artillery unis. Although no units will be specifi-
cally and permanently attached, they will be
directly available for peace-keeping and humani-
tarian operations. Troops will remain with their
national armed forces and be earmarked for WEU
when needed for missions undertaken by WEU.
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25. The command of EUROMARFOR does
not require the creation of new permanent struc-
tures. Existing command structures will intensify
their co-operation and learn how to co-operate
better. ln the case of an operation, a joint com-
mand will be established under the alternating
command of one of the headquarters of the parti-
cipating states. Other member states of WEU can,
if they wish, be admitted to participate in the two
forceso after acceptance by the other participants.
(d) Exercises
26. In preparation of the present initiative,
France, Italy and Spain have held a number of air-
maritime exercises.
27. The frst exercise, Farfadet 92, wx held in
the South of France in 1992. This was only a
French-Italian exercise in which Spain partici-
pated as an observer. The aim of the exercise was
the simulation of a rescue mission, including the
removal of residents from conflict zones.
28. The second exercise, Ardente 93, in the last
two weeks of October 1993 in cenftal Italy, com-
prised 10 000 troops from France, Italy and Spain
with the participation of six other countries. This
was considered the fust ever WEU exercise. The
main objectives of the exercise included the build-
up and ftansfer of a combined multinational force
in an out-of-area operation, command and control
in overseas operations, the use of special forces
and electronic warfare for intelligence gathering,
organisation and conduct of search-and-evacua-
tion operations, the study of rules of engagement.
29. The third exercise was Tramontana 94 with
France, Italy and Spain as the main participants,
on 14th-25th November 1994, tl the southeast of
Spain. Further participants were Greece, the
Netherlands, Portugal and a battalion of the Euro-
pean Corps. This exercise, comprising 8 000
ftoops, was also concenffated on the simulation of
evacuations in a humanitarian operation.
30. These exercises have already greatly
improved co-operation among the air-maritime
forces of France, Italy and Spain. The abovemen-
tioned exercises demonstrated the lack of ground
forces in such operations.
31. [n September 1995, the next exercise, Mis-
tral 95, will again be held in the south of France.
III. The Dutch-British awphibiaus force
32. After having been nationally oriented since
the second world war, the Dutch marines corps
decided, in 1968, that it was necessary to have the
ability to deploy amphibious-frained marines for
the benefit of SACLANT. In 1970, rhe Nether-
lands realised that within the framework of the
Maritime Contingency Force Atlantic it was
necessary to co-operate with the British marines,
with the British also agreeing that co-operation
would be beneficial for the efficiency of both
corps. This resulted in modest exercises of both
corps in 1971 and 1972.
33. On 9th May 1973, this co-operation was
formalised by the signing of the memorandum of
understanding (MoU), the officialisation of the
Dutch-British amphibious force (UK/I{L/AD, the
prime example of NAIO/European maritime co-
operation and often seen as one of the most mili-
tarily effective (flexibility and operational effec-
tiveness) multinational European forces. This
MoU was re-adapted n 1979,1987 and is at the
moment being revised again.
34. The MoU covers, inter alia, the following
aspects: the constituent units of UKA.{L/AF and
their way of concentration during deployment;
command and control; logistic support; common
exercises and training in times of peace.
(a) Missians
35. The UIVNL landing force is the land com-
ponent of the UK/NUAF and is a lightly-equip-
ped unit which is quickly deployable and which
operates independently. The UK/NL/LF is prima-
rily destined for the execution of amphibious ope-
rationsflandings and prolonged land operations. It
is a mobile unit, capable of operations on any type
of terrain and under any climatic conditions and,
because of that, it is perfectly suited for crisis-
management operations anywhere in the world
(for example operation Haven, North Iraq, 1991).
36. In the framework of NAIO, the UK/I.{L/LF
can be deployed on the northern and southern
flank of the territory of NAIO and on the Atlantic
lslands. With the growing emphasis nowadays on
the problems of Southern Europeo the UIVI\L/LF
has also become available to Commander Allied
Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED, when not
needed by SACLANT).
(b) Composition
37. The British contribution to the UK/NL/LF
is the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines(3 CdoBdeRM, headquarters in Plymouth). The
Dutch contribution is formed by units of the group
operational units of the marine corps. During ope-
rations and exercises the units are placed under
the command of the Commander UK/NI-/LF.
38. The 3rd Commando Brigade consists of:
- 
a headquarters and signals squadron
royal marine;
- 
three royal marines commandos;
- 
a royal marines air squadron (Gazelle
helicopters);
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- 
the 29th royal artillery commando regi-
ment;
- 
8451846 naval air squadron (NAS);
- 
the 59 independent commando squadron
royal engineers;
- 
a commando logistics regiment royal
marines;
- 
the 539 assault squadron royal marines.
39. The Dutch units, contributed to the
UIVI.[I/].{L, are:
- 
the lst marines battalion;
- 
the lst mortar company;
- 
a paft of the engineers platoon;
- 
the anti-aircraft platoon;
- 
a platoon and staff element of the boat
company;
- 
a part of the amphibious reconnaissance
platoon;
- 
a logistic element.
q. The UK/I.U-/LF has 5 200 men in times of
peace (3 600 British,900 Dutch).
41. The combat support units are expected to
support the manoeuvre units and because the
LJIUT.IIJLF is partly deployable by means of heli-
copters there are certain special requirements for
the weapon systems. Support is given by:
- 
the 29th royal artillery commando regi-
ment with the light 105 mm gun. The lst
Dutch mortar company is integrated in
this unit and has the 120 mm mortar;
- 
air defence troops, which belong to the
headquarters and signal squadron RM
equipped with the anti-aircraft weapons,
in which the Dutch anti-aircraft platoon
is integrated and is equipped with the
Stinger;
- 
the 59th independent commando squa-
dron royal engineers, for the engineers
support. The Dutch engineers platoon
can be integrated in this unit;
- 
helicopter support (for reconnaissance,
command and control and troops sup-
Port);
- 
the 539th assault squadron RM, takes
care of the transfer of the UK/NL/LF
from ship to landing strand, the bigger
units of which are landing craffs vehicle
and landing crafts utility.
42. Logistic support is provided by the com-
mando logistic regiment RM, which includes a
transport squadron, a combat supply group, a
medical squadron, a workshop squadron and
administrative units. For the transport of supplies,
merchant ships are hired in times of pooce, and
commandeered in times of war. The communica-
tion system used in the UK/iIIJLF is the British
" Clansman " radio-system.
43. The headquarters of the Royal Marines is
located in Portsmouth, together with Comman-
dant-General Royal Marines, the Head of the
Royal Marines. The Command-General RM falls
under CINCFLEET (Commander-in-Chief). The
Commander of the Dutch sea forces retains full
command over the units of the marines corps
during the deployment of the UK/NL/LF. The
commander of the commando logistic regiment
RM is the deputy brigade commander of the
UK/NI-/LF.
4. The units of the Dutch marine corps have
been fully integrated into the UK/NI/LF. Tactical
and logistic procedures have been completely
assimilated and the material has been standardi-
sed where possible.
(c) Relarioru wilh NATO andWEU
45. Within NATO, the UIVNULF forms a part
of the rapid reaction forces under SACLANT,
especially meant for combat crisis situations.
46. The UK/NL/AF is available for possible
out-of-area military tasks under the auspices of
WEU, as specified by the Petersberg declaration.
The UK/IrIUAF was declared a force answerable
to WEU (FAWEU) at the Rome summit meeting
on l9th May 1993. The UIVIi{UAF, or part of it,
can be deployed after a WEU Council decision to
do so and a common decision of both participat-
ing countries to place the UK/I.{UAF at the dispo-
sal of WEU. The deployment of the UK/I.{UAF is
based on plans formulated by the Planning Cell
and the Operational Commander, designated by
WEU. To this purpose, the UK/I.IUAF regularly
provides fip plarrning Cell with updated informa-
tion. In the framework of NATO a point of contact
provides regularly updated information to CINC-
FLEET. In the case of an operation, the British
and Dutch units are placed under the operational
command and control of the Operation Comman-
der. After this transfer of authority, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom retain responsibi-
lity for personnel and adminisftative matters and
for logistic support.
(d) Erercises
47. The UK/I.{L/LF participates every year in
the NATO exercise on the northern flank, for
which preparational raining is held every January
to March in Norway. Furthermore the UK/iU-/LF
takes part in the Combined Amphibious Force
Mediterranean (CAFMED) exercises, once or
twice ayear, in the Mediterranean. Every autumn,
the UKA,IL/LF takes part in NATO exercises in
Norway or Denmark or in the United Kingdom.
48, In the foreseeable future, the UK/NL/LF
will participate in the following exercises: Tartan
Venture (June 1995), Rolling Deep (September
1995), Mistral (September 1995), Dynamic Mix
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(October 1995), Battle Griffin (March 1996),
Destined Glory (May 1996).
(e) New dovelopmen8
49. On 6th April 1995, the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands signed an exchange of letters
regarding common interests in the area of maritime
defence and a reaffirmation and strengthening of
co-operation between the two navies in such areas
as logistics, personnel, training,, research and
development, information, hydrography, oceano-
graphy etc. It shows the common will of both
countries to develop closer links in all naval acti-
vities and to contribute to the development of the
European corlmon foreign and security policy.
The exchange of letters does not alter the many
existing MoUs regarding the UK/I'{UAF and the
navy to navy agreements concerning submarine
matters, nor does it prevent the signing of further
MoUs, but it seeks to draw them together under a
single policy directive.
50. These closer links, to be developed, include:
- 
closer co-operation between the respective
defence departments and the constitution
of even closer maritime links;
- 
closer co-operation betrveen operational
and planning staffs and those of their
subordinate commanders. Probably this
will be further enhanced by the develop-
ment of a navy to navy letter of intent on
closer co-operation in the Caribbean.
Co-operation in other areas such as sub-
marine forces is envisaged. Another
domain of close co-operation is the regu-
lar participation of Royal Netherlands
Navy surface ships in all aspects of
Royal Navy operational sea training, in
exchange for the provision of essential
submarine support to flag officer sea
fraining (FOST) under the Portland cre-
dit scheme, with permanent Royal
Netherlands Navy liaison officers
assigned to the FOST staff. The above-
mentioned exchange of letters also men-
tions that further opportunities for co-
operation should be investigated;
- 
exploration of the arrangements on logis-
tic co-operation and co-operation in the
domain of equipment are to be encou-
raged, both on a bilateral and NATO
basis. Examples of these arrangements
are: the close links between naval sup-
port command and the Royal Nether-
lands Navy; the ties between the defence
helicopter support authority and the
Royal Netherlands Navy through the
Lynx multinational suppqrt eonmitteel
liaison between the director general fleet
support and the Royal Netherlands Navy
liaison ofhcer;
- 
more exchange of personnel and com-
mon haining;
- 
extension of research and development
and the pooling of knowledge and expe-
rience, under the Anglo-Netherlands
Joint Naval Committee, created by the
Defence Research MoU, 1991;
- 
enhancement of co-operation by regular
and good quality information exchanges
in all areas of mutual interest (technical
data doctrine and tactical developments
etc.);
- 
more co-operation between the two res-
pective hydrographic offices.
51. On 6th April 1995, the Secretary of State
for Defence of the United Kingdom, Malcolm
Rifkind, and the Dutch Minister of Defence, Joris
Voorhoeve, also signed a statement of intent on
tri-service defence co-operation. It concerns their
intention to extend existing co-operation in naval
matters to other areas within their organisation,
including land and air forces.
IV The Allied Command. Europe
rapid reaction corys (ARRC)
52. In late May 1991, theNAIO Defence Plan-
ning Committee agreed in principle to create an
allied rapid reaction corps (ARRC). This was
endorsed at the NAIO summit meeting in Rome
in November 1991 as apart of NAf,O's adaptation
to the changing strategic security environment
and was worked out in the new sftategic concept,
in which highly-mobile, multinational and
flexible forces replace the former linear defence
forces of NAIO.
53. The ARRC headquarters was officially
activated at Bielefeld, Germany, on 2nd October
1992,with the ARRC being officially recognised
by General John M. Shalikashvili, Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The
corps will be able to draw forces from thirteen
natibns, NAf,O member states: Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Pornrgal, Spain, Tirrkey, the Uni-
ted Kingdom and the United States. In peacetime
the ARRC takes its guidance from SACEUR. The
ARRC headquarters is an international headquar-
ters directly subordinate to SACEUR and the
Commander ARRC (COMARRC), who co-ordi-
nates authority over the divisions, reports to
SACEUR and ARRC headquarters. Supreme
Headquarters AlliedPowers Europe (SHAPE) has
overall control over the ARRC, a decision to
deploy forces must follow the appropriate proce-
dure before SHAPE can commit the ARRC.
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54. The United Kingdom, as the framework
nation, will always provide the commander of the
ARRC, a three-star general. From October 1992
until December 1994, Lieutenant-General Sir
Jeremy McKenzie commanded the ARRC. He
was replaced in December 1994 by Lieutenant-
General M.J.D. Walker.
(a) Missions
55. Within the NAIO new strategic concept,
the ARRC forms the land component of the Allied
Command Europe (ACE) rapid reaction forces.
The air and sea elements of this rapid reaction
force can operate independently or alongside the
ARRC. In support of SACEUR's crisis-manage-
ment options at short notice, the ARRC has five
r6les, in a so-called " ACE-wide-plus-area o':
- 
demonstration of resolve to be prepared
for any aggression;
- 
reinforcement of NAIO's main defence
forces and of national forces;
- 
combat r6le in sustained multinational
operations up to corps level in case of a
major conflict;
- 
peace support operations (PSOs) in res-
ponse to regional conflicts or at the
request of the United Nations or the
Organisation for Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe (OSCE). Such peace sup-
port operations will include, amongst
otherso monitoring tasks, humanitarian
assistance and peace-keeping ;
- 
the performance of other related tasks as
monitoring, movement control or disar-
mament verification tasks.
(b) Conposirion
56. The ARRC has a permanent headquarters,
located in Rheindahlen since May 1994. Troops
and units assigned to it will be allocated for speci-
fic operations as a force package. The ARRC
comprises a headquarters staff, combat support
units, combat service support units and the assign-
ed divisions. The ARRC force structure includes
ten divisions, which fall into the following cate-
gories:
- 
National divisions which consist of for-
mations solely from one nationo the fol-
lowing forces being assigned to the
ARRC:
- 
Germany; the 7th armoured division
with up to three brigades (headquar-
ters in Diisseldo$;
- 
United Kingdom: the lst armoured
division (headquarters in Herford),
with three brigades;
- 
Greece: the 2nd mechanised division
(headquarters in Edhessa), with two
mechanised brigades;
- 
Turkey: a Turkish division will be
operational within the ARRC in 1995,
but the assigned T[rkish mechanised
brigade and the Tlrkish armoured bri-
gade are currently already operational;
- 
United States: the 1st armoured divi-
sion (headquarters in Bad Kreuznach),
with two armoured and one mechani-
sed brigade;
- 
Spain: the fully operational Spanish
rapid reaction force (EAR), consisting
of a Para brigade, a light aeromobile
brigade, a legion brigade and support
units.
- 
Framework divisions, which contain
troops from two nations, in which the
nation making the major contribution
provides the framework. Framework
divisions within the ARRC are:
- 
The 3rd UK division (headquarters in
Bulford) consisting of the 1st and 19th
mechanised brigades, the 5th airborne
brigade and an Italian brigade, the
Ariette armoured brigade;
- 
The ltalian mechanised division
(headquarters near Milan) operational
by 1995. It will consist of the Garibaldi
brigade, the Legnano brigade and a
Portuguese airborne brigade.
- 
Multinationnl divisiorzs in which three or
more nations make an equal contribu-
tion. Multinational divisions within the
ARRC are:
- 
The multinational division (Cental)(MND(c))
The MND(C) will be an airmobile
division comprised of airborne bri-
gades from Belgium and Germany and
airmobile brigades from the Nether-
lands (the 1lth brigade) and the United
Kingdom (the 24th brigade). The
MND(C) headquarters is located in
Rheindahlen;
- 
The multinational division (South)(MND(s))
The MND(S)) will include a Greek
infantry brigade, an Italian airbome bri-
gade and a Ttrkish commando brigade.
(c) Tiaining
57. Ready to tackle a whole mix of missions,
the ARRC had34 exercises planned for l994,the
most important of which were:
t2
DOCITIICNT 1468
- 
Mapex,l9ttr-2Oth January 1994, to study
the capacity of ARRC headquarters for
possible action of the ARRC in Bosnia-
Herzegovina;
- 
Arrcade Guard, a command exercise
with some 2 000 troops participating
with the objective of validating proce-
dures for deployment to a foreign coun-
try under a United Nations mandated
peace support operation. A similar Arr-
cade Guard exercise will be held from
21st to 28th April 1995. The training of
the combat ftoops takes place at national
and divisional level.
(d) Shortcomings of the ARRC
58. Participants regret the absence of France in
the ARRC, but they are aware that France's non-
participation in NAIO's integrated military struc-
ture is an unsurmountable impediment.
59. As for the ARRC itself, it is thought that
the disparate nature of the main elements and the
fact that its troops are widely dispersed in peace-
time will causeproblems. The ARRC has no autho-
rity to train the forces assigned; it can only request
the participating states to provide troops assigned
to the ARRC with the appropriate training.
60. Furthermore, it is suggested that the domin-
ance of the United Kingdom within the ARRC(the United Kingdom provides the day-to-day
infrastructure, running costs, 607o of the staff and
the Commander and the Chief-of-Staff of the
ARRC) might one day cause problems. Given its
preponderant position in ARRC, it might not be
atractive for the United Kingdom to participate in
other European armed forces initiatives where it
would play a different and most probably less
important r6le. Other European states have in fact
reluctantly criticised the dominance of the United
Kingdom within the ARRC.
61. Although all nations provide their own
logistical support, the ARRC is heavily dependent
upon the United States for sftategic lift 
- 
mostly
aircraft and partially shipping 
- 
and satellite intel-
figence. The United Kingdom provides the largest
part of long-haul communications with some
contributions from other countries.
62. Initially, the ARRC was planned to be ope-
rational by 1995, but NATO Headquarters had
sufficient confidence in the progress to commit
units of the ARRC to peace-keeping duties in
Bosnia-Herzegovina as early as summer 1993.
V The Dutch-German anny corps
63. On 30th March 1993, the Ministers of
Defence of Germany and the Netherlands, Relus
Ter Beek and Volker Riihe, acting upon NAIO's
London declaration of July 1990 and Rome decla-
ration of November 1991, signed a common decla-
ration concerning the creation of a multinational
corps. The joint declaration announced the creation
of a multinational corps, with initially Dutch and
German participation as a main defence force, in
conformity with the new strategic concept of
NATO. The Dutch-Gennan corps will be open to
other NAIO member states for participation.
64. Although the corps has nor yet been made
officially available to WEU, units of the corps
may be deployed in WEU operations. Joint opera-
tions with the European Corps, although it is not a
part of the integrated NATO military structure, are
not excluded because some of the forces in the
European Corps are also earmarked as NATO
main defence force units.
65. The headquarters of the Dutch-German
army corps, which is located in Miinster (Germany)
and became operational in March 1995, has a
unique, completely integrated corps staff with
partial task specialisation, composed of 400 men
(507o Dutch,5OTo German). The command of the
anny corps will rotate every three years, the frst
commander being a Dutchman, Lieutenant-General
Ruurd Reitsema. The official language of the
corps will be English. The Dutch-German army
corps is expected to be operational by the end of
August 1995.
(a) Missians
66. The Dutch-German anny corps is part of
the main defence forces of NATO, integrated in
NATO's command structures and will come under
direct LANDCENT command. When half of the
Dutch anny was dissolved as a consequence of
defence budget cuts, it was decided to merge the
remaining forces with German forces so that the
Dutch army would still be able to co-operate
effectively in military defence operations within
NAIO. [t was also thought that this move, with its
ineluctable international obligations, would pro-
tect the Dutch army against further budget cuts.
The army corps will function only in situations of
war; in peacetime it will remain under national
command, so that the two countries will be free to
use parts of the corps for crisis-management ope-
rations within NATO or any other international
context.
(b) Compositian
67. The Dutch-German army corps will be
composed of the following units:
- 
the 1st Dutch division (headquarters in
Apeldoorn) consisting of:
. the 41st light brigade;
. the llth airmobile brigade;
. the 13th, the 43rd and the 52nd mecha-
nised brigades.
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- 
the lst German armoured division (head-
quarters in Hanover) which consists of:
. the lst, the 19th and the 32nd mecha-
nised brigades.
. the 7th armoured division (headquar-
ters in Dtisseldofl, which can also be
used in the ARRC.
68. The corps will be 35 000 men strong. The
command and support group will be mixed and
will be established in Eibergen, in the Nether-
lands. Support will be provided by corps troops
with taskipecialisation: Germany, for example,
will provide most of the intelligence assets and
the Netherlands will provide corps-level corrmu-
nications. The integration will be accommodated
through equipment standardisation.
69. The only possible serious problem for the
Dutch-German army corps might be the fact that
the divisions are separate and co-operate only in
times of crisis.
W, IANDIUT (Headqyafierc allied lnnd forces,
S chle swig - H ols tein and I utlnnd)
70. NATO's LANDJUT corps is the oldest
example of a multinational corps within the
NATO organisation. The multinational head-
quarters 
- 
Headquarters Allied Land Forces,
Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (LANDruT) -
located in Rendsburg, Germany, was created in
l962.lnthe Oslo agreement of 1951, it was deci-
ded to form a combined and joint defence head-
quarters (Baltic Approaches, BALIAP) with two
corps, LANDruT and LANDffiALAND, t9 pr9-
tecf the critical land area controlling the Baltic
approaches and exits.
71. In peacetime LANDruT is manned only by
Danish and German forces (although the head-
quarters also involves other NATO officers), but
ih times of war it can be expanded to include
forces from Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States. The Commander of LANDruT,
currently the Danish Lieutenant-General Gustav
Griiner, reports directly to the Commander Allied
Forces Baltic Approaches in Karup, Denmark,
who, in turn, in accordance with the new sffategic
concept of November 1991, reports to the Com-
mand-er-in-Chief Central Europe (CINCENT,
Brunssum). Overall control reverts to the Supre-
me Allied Commander Europe (SACELJR).
72. The commander and chief-of-staffrotate in
a three-year cycle benveen Denmark and Germany,
the other permanent staff positions are distributed
on an equal basis among the nations.
73. There are no formal relations between
LANDJUT and WEU. In the suntmer of 1994,
however, the Danish Parliament decided that if
WEU made a request to use Danish forces assign-
ed to NATO, it could rely on Denmark's LAND-
JUT units.
(a) Missions
74. The initial mission of the Commander
LANDruT (COMLANDJUT) was to ensure the
flexible forward defence of the territory confrol-
ling the Baltic approaches and exis and to deny
an attack into the heart of Schleswig-Holstein and
Jutland and the Baltic Sea area up to Poland. Pos-
session of the strategically important Baltic
approaches is essential for the cohesion of
NAIO's defence of Europe.
75. With the end of the Warsaw Pact, the need
for a strong defence towards Poland has diminished
but the collective defence tasks of LANDJUT
remain.
(b) ComPosition
76. The Danish conEibution to the LANDJUT
corps consists of the armoured infantry Jutland
divilion with headquarters in Frederica Denmark.
77. Since NAIO's increased focus on peace-
keeping and crisis-management as indicated in its
new srategic concept of November 1991, Den-
mark reorg-anised its forces on 1st July 1994 and
created a new force, the Danish reaction brigade,
is objective being to integrate this force into the
ARRe by the end of 1995. The Danish reaction
brigade has become a modern, heavy-armoured
infantry brigade of about 4 500 men. The most
important parts of the reaction brigade are:
- 
one armoured battalion with among
others three tank squadrons, equipped
with lcopard 1A5 tanks;
- 
two mechanised infanbry battalions;
- 
one self-propelled artillery battalion.
78. This Danish reaction brigade does not co-
operate with LANDJUT in peacetime, but in
times of war can be allocated to the LANDruT
corps for reinforcement.
79. The German contribution to LANDJUT
consists of the 6th armoured infantry division
with headquarters in Neumiinster (Kiel, Germany),
composed of the 7th mechanised brigade (Ham-
burg, Germany) and the 18th mechanised brigade
(Boosted, Denmark). Also part of the German
confiibution is the German defence group 13, a
territorial brigade-size formation located at Eutin,
Gennany, with a defence mission in the forward
defence area.
80. Normally, corps combat support and service
troops come from both counfries with each coun-
ury supporting its own troops, but exceptionally a
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few combined units are to be created. Combined
communication systems already exist.
81. The headquarters has a reduced peacetime
strength of around 100 men, including officers
and non-commissioned officers from Germany,
Denmark, Canada the United Kingdom and the
United States. The latter three countries have cer-
tain contingency forces earmarked for the area.
82. LANDJUT's left flank neighbour is the
Allied Land Forces,T.raland, in peacetime a natio-
nal Danish corps command at Ringsted, operating
together with the Danish fleet, the Danish airforce
and parts of German naval forces. The LANDJUT
corps maintains close liaison with ttrese forces as
well as with its neighbour to the right, the lst Ger-
man corps south of the river Elbe.
(c) Exercises
83. To enhance interoperability, a constant and
pennanent exercise progftlrnme is conducted at all
levels from headquarters to the company through-
out the year, on German and Danish soil. Every
four years, a major live exercise is conducted
under the name of Bold Guard, in which, since
1989, American and British naval- and land-
forces can take part. The exercises are held under
the command of the multinational corps head-
quarters.
(d) Criticdpoints
84. The introduction of external reinforce-
ments from the United Kingdom or the United
States into the area brings a number of host nation
support problems that only national commands
can solve. Furthermore, there is a problem of
availability of forces. The German forces are rea-
dily available and near their wartime positions but
the Danish forces must be partially mobilised and
moved to wartime positions.
85. Notwithstanding the abovementioned pro-
blems, it is noted that, because of its long expe-
rience, the LANDJUT corps has already over-
come its most urgent problems including
language. Together with the Anglo-Dutch amphi-
bious force and the European Corps, the LAND-
JUT corps can therefore be considered as the only
operational multinational force.
VII. Co-operalion iniliatives in Belgium
and. the Netherlands
(a) Belgian-Netherlands rwval co-operation
86. On 28th June 1994, the Dutch and Belgian
Ministers of Defence, Relus Ter Beek and Leo
Delcroix, signed a declaration of common intent
on the reinforcement of the Dutch-Belgian naval
co-operation in times of peace and war and in
times of crisis and tension. The agreement called
for both navies to co-operate in operations, logis-
tics, instruction and training. Both countries had
severely cut their defence budgets and abolished
conscription. The ensuing fundamental review of
their naval forces and the standing down of the
Belgian navy's maritime command centre at
Ostend, further increased their desire to achieve
more intensive multinational military co-opera-
tion. Some observers consider the initiative as a
possible nucleus for closer co-operation between
the two nations and even in a wider international
context.
87. During the annual meeting of the Ministers
of Defence of Benelux, in Alden-Biezen, Belgium,
on 28th March 1995, the current Ministers of
Defence of the Netherlands and Belgium, Joris
Voorhoeve and Karel Pinxten, formalised the
intent of both countries in an extensive co-opera-
tion agreement. Co-operation is intended to be
effective on lst January 1996 and will result in the
creation of one of the largest naval forces in
NATO.
88. The objective of the Dutch-Belgian naval
co-operation is to promote efficiency and better
mutual use of existing expertise and means, and to
improve operational readiness. The two navies
will also operate together in peacetime, possibly
outside their territorial waters, which means an
extension of the 1951 Admiral Benelux agree-
ment" which only envisaged co-operation in times
of war.
89. The 1995 co-operation agreement in parti-
cular envisages the following activities:
- 
the creation of an integrated bi-national
operational command staffcentre in Den
Helder, the Netherlands, jointly manned
by Belgian and Dutch officers but it is
stipulated that each country retains the
possibility of committing its ships to
purely national missions or making them
available to international organisations.
The centre will be under the command of
a Benelux Admiral (currently Dutch,
Vice-Admiral Luuk Kroon), but it is not
excluded that a Belgian naval officer
may be assigned this command. The staff
will have command of 40 Dutch and
about 10 Belgian surface vessels 
- 
sub-
marines and naval patrol boats have been
excluded. The official languages will be
Dutch and French, with English used for
operations and procedures within
NATO;
- 
cornmon operation/command of opera-
tional fleets;
- 
adjustment and integration of training
and education;
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- 
deepening of existing co-operation
agreements in mat6riel and logistics,
standardisation of equipment and use of
coilrmon infrastructure.
90. A very wide range of opportunities for co-
operation has been outlined, comprising;
- 
joint schemes for ocean surveillance;
- 
greater transparency in procurement
plans and in strategic intelligence, the
pooling of expertise in ship design and
construction and logistic standardisation;
- 
combined operational exercises;
- 
joint action in the enforcement of inter-
national law and order at sea.
91. The objectives of joint planning and joim
exercises are undertaking missions regarding
peace-keeping, search and rescue and humanita-
rian operations.
92. Around the year 2000, the combined
Dutch-Belgian fleet is planned to have under its
command 19 frigates (16 Dutch and 3 Belgian),
1 landing platform dock (LPD), 4 underway
replenishment and command ships, up to 26 mine
countermeasure vessels (MCMVs) and support
and survey ships. Belgium might contribute one
or more amphibious transport ships (LPDs).
(b) The Belgian-Netherlands deplayahlz air tasktorce
93. In June 1994, when Belgium and the
Netherlands signed the declaration of common
intent on naval co-operation, both parties also
stressed the importaice of closer cb-operation
between their air forces. At their meeting in
Alden-Biezen, on 28th March 1995, the Ministers
Pinxten and Voorhoeve also signed a declaration
of intent on the creation of a deployable air task
force (DAIF), which is meant to be a joint inter-
vention air wing, to be employed first and fore-
most for peace operations. The division of tasks
and the concepts for the use of this force have yet
to be defined and a definitive agreement, specify-
ing the different elements of co-operation will, in
principle, be signed before 1st January 1996. The
idea is to create a force which can be easily adapt-
ed to the situation and the tasks to be fulfilled.
94. Both Belgium and the Netherlands think
that the creation of this deployable air task force
will help them to reduce costs through the use of
coillmon and complementary assets, especially in
the domain of logistics and command and to
improve operational efficiency for common air
operations. They also take the view that it could
be the frst step towards the creation of a Europe-
wide partnership of smaller air forces. Depending
on the situation, the Benelux wing could be
deployed in support of United Nations, WEU,
NAIO or OSCE sponsored operations.
95. The intent is to maintain the independence
of each of the two participating air forces, particu-
larly in policy and planning. It is also thought that
this form of co-operation should not be extended
too far, given the experience that in general smaller
air forces are more productive than larger ones.
Force multiplication through collaboration in
complementarity is to be preferred.
VIII. The Franco-British Euro air group
(a) Tasks, objective and funportance
96. The ministerial announcement of the for-
mation of the Franco-British Euro Air Group
(FBEAG), a joint air command, was one outcome
of the 17th Anglo-French summit meeting at
Charres on 18th November 1994. The framework
agreement, a formal agreement regarding the
creation of the FBEAG, is currently in the final
stages of drafting.
97. The new air group is in fact a planning and
co-ordination cell with no aircraft permanently
allocated to it, which could designate, if need be
and on a case-by-case base, the best adapted com-
bat or transport squadrons of the two countries to
participate in operations and exercises. It will be
responsible for preparing requirements and proce-
dures for combat and transport missions and com-
mon use of assets in combined out-of-area and
non-NAIO-ArticIe 5 peace-keeping and humani-
uarian operations which are compatible with mis-
sions mentioned in the Petersberg declaration.
98. The FBEAG constitutes an operational cell
for disributing assignments between French and
British fliers and drawing forces from existing
units, in the framework of combined operations
set up on short notice, with the respective forces
remaining under national command. These opera-
tions will be conducted either bilaterally or possi-
bly under the auspices of WEU. At Chartres, it
was stated that other European Union air forces
could join the group at a later stage.
99. At this stage, the political interest of this
initiative is far more important than its military
sigfficance. Apparently, on the one hand, France
has started to attach more importance to co-opera-
tion in military planning, while, on the other hand,
the United Kingdom is showing more interest in
European initiatives and a greater commitment to
European defence. Moreover, the FBEAG consti-
tutes the fust joint military initiative between the
only two European countries capable of signifi-
cantly projecting their military power overseas.
100. It is expected that ties will be developed
with WEU and probably also with NA[O, as the
United Kingdom has stressed the complementarity
of the FBEAG to NAIO. The EBEAG is planned
to be operational by lst September 1995.
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(b) Structure
101. France and the United Kingdom have
agreed to establish a permanent staff of ten senior
officers (five from each nation) at the Royal Air
Force base at High Wycombe. The frst director of
the FBEAG will be a French two star general,
combining this task with his duties in the French
national air force. His deputy will be a British one
star air commodore, who will combine this task
with his assignment at Strike Command. These
posts will alternate between the two nations.
102. The permanent staff will have a chief of
staff and a deputy with the rank of colonel or
group captain, again one from each nation and
alternating between the two nations. Serving
under their command there will be fow staff offi-
cers from each nation, specialised in operational
and logistical matters, who will be tasked with
making both air forces complementary and inter-
operational. Overarching control will be in the
hands of a steering group at ministerial or Chief of
Defence staff level. A lower level working group
will deal with the day-to-day activities of the
FBEAG.
103. The staff will be able to draw forces from
any unit of the two countries air forces, including
transport aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft, offen-
sive airpower and communications or troops to
establish and guard ground bases. The FBEAG
may also be able to call on naval aircraft.
IX. Affilintion of the Danish reafiion brigade
and the lst United Kingdom armoured division
l0/. After the restructuring of the Danish forces
and the creation of the Danish reaction brigade
which started in October 1993, discussions began
on how to integrate this reaction brigade into
NATO and especially into the ARRC. In order to
enable it to carry out a broad spectrum ofinterna-
tional missions, the Danish reaction brigade pur-
sued co-operation with forces of other NATO
member states. [t was thought that after Germany,
to which Danish forces were already closely link-
ed in the LANDruT corps, the United Kingdom,
in view of its geographical proximity, was the
next logical co-operation partner.
105. On 13th December l994,the Danish Chief
of Staff of the armed forces, General J. Lyng, and
his counterpart from the United Kingdom, Field
Marshall Sir Peter Inge, signed a letter of intent on
the affiliation between the Danish reaction brigade
and the lst UK armoured division. This affiliation
is intended to lead to the establishment of a divi-
sional formation within the framework of the lst
UK armoured division, to be part of NATO's
ARRC as from 1st January 1996. In case of acti-
vation of the ARRC, the Danish brigade will be
practically integrated into the British division,
which will facilitate and simplify command in the
ARRC.
(a) Missions
106. The Danish and British forces are expected
to co-operate in support of the ARRC's missions
which are, as mentioned in paragraph 17 of this
report: demonsffation of resolve, reinforcement of
main defence, combat and peace support opera-
tions such as humanitarian assistance and peace-
keeping.
107 . There is still doubt about whether the Danish
reaction brigade will be able to implement mis-
sions outside NATO's treaty area in Cenral and
Eastern Europe.
(b) Composition
108. The 4 5OO-sfrong Danish reaction brigade
comprises amongst others one armoured batta-
lion, two mechanised infantry battalions and one
self-propelled artillery battalion. The lst United
Kingdom armoured division consists of the 4th,
7th and 20th arrnoured brigades.
109. Since these forces are only affrliated there
is no joint headquarters, only an exchange of liai-
son officers. There is no common commander and
both countries support their own troops, without a
pre-established support co-operation system.
Logistical support provision is also separate.
There might be integration in fransport and com-
munications, the Danish headquarters company is
linked to British communication systems.
(c) Relatians wilh NATO and WEU
110. In view of the loose structure of the Danish-
British affiliation, there was no need for any for-
mal agreement with NATO in the ARRC frame-
work. Provisions have been made for some form
of command co-operation in case of combined
deployment of the affiliated Danish and British
forces. Only in this case does the Danish com-
mander report to the British commander, other-
wise command is separated. There is no perma-
nent infrastructural co-operation.
111. Unlike the Danish brigade, the 1st United
Kingdom armoured division is also available for
WEU missions. It is, however, noted that the
Danish Parliament has decided that Denmark will
not withdraw its forces if WEU oo borrows " forces
from NAIO in which Danish forces participate.
The Danish reaction brigade participating in British
exercises in Germany under the control of the
ARRC have already demonstrated a perfect sym-
biosis.
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X. Tlvo German-Ameriian corps
ll2. On 25th February 1993, the then American
Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, and the German
Minister of Defence, Riihe, agreed in Washington
on the creation of two German-American corps,
which were constituted on 22nd April 1993 in
Giebelstadt in the neighbourhood of Wiirzburg, to
increase the number of multinational military
units in Central Europe. These corps were created
as a central element of NAIO's new main defence
force. It is recalled here that NAIO's new strate-
gic concept called for smaller, more flexible, and
more mobile forces. Initially, co-operation was
limited to the exchange of headquarters officers,
but in May 1994 it was decided to give both corps
a multinational structure.
(a) Compositian
113. The two Gerrnan-American corps are: the
2nd German-US corps (53 000 men) and the 5th
US-German corps (56 000 men), each being a so-
called framework corps with a'o lead nation ".
ll4. The 2nd German-US corps comprises the
2nd Gerrnan corps based in LJlm and the lst US
armoured division (18 000 men) based in Bad
Kreuznach. The 2nd German corps which is also
available to the Multinational Division Cenral and
Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Forces-
Iand, consists of two divisions: the 10th tank divi-
sion, located in Sigmaringen ( 1 8 0@ men) which is
also part of the European Corps and the lst Moun-
tein division, located in Munich (17 000 men).
115. The 5th US-German corps comprises the
5th US corps based in Frankfurt and the 5th Ger-
man mechanised division (19 000) based in
Mainz. The 5th US corps consists of trryo divi-
sionso the 3rd mechanised division (18 500 men)
and the lst armoured division (18 500 men) both
based in Bad Kreuznach. The lst US armoured
division is also assigned to the ARRC; the United
States decides at the critical moment which mis-
sion the division will have.
116. The staffs of both corps will, in principle,
retain their national structures but it is understood
that for exercises and operations in the framework
of NAIO, the lst US armoured division and the
5th German mechanised division will be subordi-
nated to the 2nd German-US corps and the 5th
US-German corps, respectively, with joint staff
for planning and command. The subordinated
divisions are expected to have their own support
and logistics means, intelligence and the decision
for deployment is taken under national authority.
(b) Diffuullizs in co-operalion
lI7. Co-operation within the two German-US
corps may face some problems as a result of dissi-
milarities between the forces of the two countries.
For example, the United States force is a profes-
sional force which is fully available at any given
time, while German forces depend on conscripts
and receive their general and special tasks during
deployment within alliances. This basic dissimila-
rity affects advanced planning co-ordination
between the two forces.
118. There are several structural differences,
such as the fact that the 5th US corps includes an
armoured brigade and an engineer brigade, units
which are no longer part of the 2nd German corps.
Furthermore, it is noted that the lst US armoured
diVision is better equipped, more readily available
and more easily deployed, because of its helicop-
ter brigade, than the German units which are, in
general, less mobile. Also, the two corps are
dependant on the United States for the constitu-
tion ofreserves. These differences in forces could
also frustrate their mobitty and flexibility.
(c) Erercises
119. The technical anangement, signed on 14th
June 1994, improved the willingness for deploy-
ment and both bi-national corps have declared
that they are prepared to subscribe to field stand-
ing operation procedures (FSOP). The degree of
interoperability will be tested for the first time in
a framework exercise of the 2nd German-US
corps to be held in the Spring of 1995.
XI. The combined joint taskforces (CJTF)
l2O. At their meeting in Luxembourg, on22nd
November 1993, WEU Ministers, aware of the
need to allow for specific European military ope-
rations outside the cases ofcollective defence spe-
cified under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
looked to the NATO summit meeting to endorse
the principle that WEU should be able to use not
only European allies' forces and resources, but
also collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance such
as communication systems, command facilities
and headquarters.
l2l. The NAIO summit meeting held in Brus-
sels on 10th and llth January 1994 then respon-
ded to the requests made by WEU Ministers in
Luxembourg. It endorsed the concept of combinedjoint task forces " as a means to facilitate contin-
gency operations, including operations with parti-
cipating nations outside the alliance ". It directed
the North Atlantic Council with the advice of the
NAIO military authorities to develop this concept
and establish the necessary capabilities. In the
commnniqu6 it was also said that " The Council,
with the advice of the NATO military authorities,
and in co-ordination with WEU, will work on
implementation in a manner which provides sepa-
rable but not separate capabilities that could be
18
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employed by NATO or WEU ". The CJTF
concept was the result of co-operation between
the United States Department of State and the
Pentagon, witnessing United States support for
WEU employment of NATO assets and a further
development of a European security and defence
identity.
122. The CJTF proposal aimed at a flexible and
efficient multinational, tri-service headquarters
capability for non-Article 5 contingency opera-
tions, facilitating the use of NATO collective
assets by WEU, should NATO choose not to act,
preventing useless duplication. It concerns short-
term, quick reaction multinational (combined)
and multiservice (oint) self-contained contingen-
cy elements within NAIO, which on the basis of
an ad hoc North Atlantic Council decision could
be detached for certain missions and put under the
command of WEU should NAf,O choose not to
participate in an operation. The idea is to create a
stand-by capability for out-of-area operations,
including conflict-prevention, peace-keeping,
humanitarian aid and peace-enforcement,
drawing elements from AFCENT, AFSOUTH
and AFNOMHWEST. According to the original
concept, nations outside the alliance could
participate.
123. It is thought that WEU would, in particular,
use CJTF for humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in
crisis-managemento including peace-making, as
outlined in the Petersberg declaration of June
1992.
124. Since early 1994, theimplementation of the
CJTF concept has been discussed at three levels
under the authority of the North Atlantic Council
and in co-operation with the military authorities
of NAIO. At the Military and Political Commit-
tee level, the Provisional Policy Co-ordination
Group (PPCG), is reating questions such as the
role of SACEUR, the activation process of CJ-IF,
etc. At the major NATO command level, under
the command of SACEUR, the Military Transi-
tion lssue Working Group is examining operatio-
nal aspects for CJTF command and control and
harmonisation of the positions of member states,
while the Allied Command Europe (ACE) and
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) are study-
ing the procedures, training and equipment
aspects. Finally, a co-ordination group at SI{APE
is discussing the composition and designation of
potential CJTF forces, though this might also be
possible on an ad hoc basis. WEU has established
a special CJTF political-military working group
and authorised the Planning Cell to take part in
the working group's weekly working meetings
and support its work. The terms of reference
for this group were approved by the Council on
15th March.
(a) Com.nwnd and conlrol
125. The basic idea of the CJTF concept is to
maintain the original objectives of NATO, while
adapting it to the new security environment. Col-
lective defence of the territory of the alliance, pre-
servation of the transatlantic character and conti-
nuation of the integrated military strucnre of the
alliance remain NATO's priorities. CJTF will
therefore be separable but never separate from
NAfO's structures.
126. The command and confrol of CJTF should,
in particular, enable it to provide timely responses
out-of-area, ensure smooth co-ordination between
NATO and WEU and accommodate staff from
participating non-NAIO members. Such opera-
tions will require the assimilation of intelligence,
logistics and management, reception and
commitment of forces and maintenance of com-
munication at all levels.
127. The CJTF headquarters will be hosted by
one of the eight NATO major subordinate com-
mands (MSC), AFCENT, AFSOUTH or
AFNORTHWEST in the case of ACE, which
might task subordinate commands to provide
assets and might receive resources from other
MSCs, with the commanders reporting directly to
the MSC. Both ACE and Allied Command Atlan-
tic (ACLANT) will develop capabilities for pos-
sible CJTF operations. NATO keeps insisting that
CJTF lines of command always lead back to the
major NATO command responsible for Article 5
defence in the region, taking the view that any
CJTF operation could escalate a straight- forward
NATO Article 5 operation to defend allied teni-
tory. For WEU-led CJTF, procedures will be esta-
blished to recall forces under NATO in the case of
territorid collective defence.
(b) CJTF underWEU
t28. There are three possibilities for the employ-
ment of CJTF;purely underNATO, aNAIO-plus
CJTF including forces from non-NAIO member
states and a CJTF under WEU.
129. After a unanimous decision of the North
Atlantic Council, a CJTF headquarters and sup-
port could be provided, on an ad hoc basis, to
WEU, which can ask for contributions from its
members, observers, associate members and asso-
ciate partners, altogether 27 states. It should be
noted here again that the essential shortcoming of
WEU in case of military operations remains the
absence of a political-military structure within
WEU. For the European Corps, however, an ade-
quate political-military structure has been created
and this force could therefore carry out a CJTF
mission, obtaining those elements from NATO
which the European Corps is lacking (logistics,
communication systems, air transport capacity,
t9
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airlift and sealift), acting under the aegis of WEU.
A solution must still be found for the participation
of France in CJTF, given the fact that it does not
participate in NAIO's integrated military structu-
re. Different proposals are now being discussed
but the problem has not yet been solved.
130. In the discussion about CJTF, the question
of which units will participate in a task force, has
not been discussed because most of the parties
expect that this will be solved without tod many
problems. For the Europeans, the CJTF remains
an essential tool for building up the European
security and defence identity (ESDI).
131. After stating the importance of CJTF in the
Kirchberg declaration (9th May 1994), WEU has
worked out a report on the criteria and modalities
foreffective use of the CJTF which was presented
to NAIO on29thlune 1994.
132. Once the North Atlantic Council has decid-
ed to provide WEU with a CJTF, NATO witl
select CJTF headquarters elements (including
support assets) from one of its MSCs and prepare
it for deployment, the control of which will at a
certain moment be given to WEU. The forces will
come from WEU member states maintaining
forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) such as the
European Corps, the United Kingdom-Nether-
lands Amphibious Force and the Multinational
Division Central. Co-ordination between CJTF
and FAWEU, and possibly their integration,
would simplify force generation processes and
arrangements.
133. An important issue on this field will be the
r6le of SACETJR and of SACLANT. Given the
fact that SACELJR is a United States General, at
present Lieutenant-General Joulwan, many Euro-
peans are concerned that in a WEU operation,
supported with CJTF, ultimate military decision-
making would be in American hands. France, in
particular, has problems in accepting the day-to-
day planning function of SACELJR, in which it
does not want to participate since this function is
part of NAIO's integrated military structure.
134. Recent declarations by the United States
that the CJTF cannot count on logistic support
from NAIO if the CJTF are not placed under the
military command of NATO, because of its
concern for escalation into Article 5 operations,
have provoked especially French opposition.
None of this changes the fact that the European
political-military structure for a CJTF under
WEU command is inadequate. Joint military
planning capabilities will have to be developed
and WEU's operational headquarters strengthen-
ed. The CJTF concept does not provide for the
automatic availability of assets; WEU will there-
fore have to retain its autonomous planning capa-
bility and should continue to develop a credible
operational r6le. ln this regard especially the r6le
of the WEU Planning Cell has to be developed
further so as to serve more as the intended motor
for exclusively European mititary operations. As
long as WEU lacks its own command stafflmili-
tary command structures, questions about military
control remain premature.
(c) Advantages of CJTF
135. The implementation of the CJTF proposal
may help NATO to adapt its command and force
structure in line with the requirements of the
alliance's sfrategic concept. First of all, it could
make current NATO procedures and structures
more flexible, simpLify communication Iinks and
rationalise mobilisations, also because it will
increasingly rely on experienced, well-trained
units. The possibility of employing " coalitions of
the willing o', with some countries participating
and others not, certainly increases flexibility
in the use of forces, but it is thought that, in deci-
sion-making, the unanimity rule in the North
Atlantic Council will not be abandoned under any
citcumstances.
t36. Second, CJTF may help to reinforce the
European security and defence identity (ESDI),
avoiding duplication which might cause waste
and damaging competition. It is also a clear
demonstration of the United States' deterrnined
support for the development of the ESDI.
137. A thfud advantage, not to be neglected, is
the possibility of conducting operations with par-
ticipating nations outside the alliance. Earlier
experience in ad hoc operations such as the Gulf
war and the enforcement of the embargo in the
Adriatic Sea have proved the feasibility of the
CJTF concept. At present, there is an urgent
requirement for smaller, more flexible and deta-
chable headquarters, which can be reinforced with
different NAIO assets according to the circum-
stances. As a consequence, there is a need to draft
possible contingency plans, indicating the opera-
tional and material requirements for different cir-
cumstances.
138. Fourth, CJTF may be a tool to engage both
France and Spain in NAIO's military planning
process for certain contingency operations.
(d) Problems corueming the implzrnentatian of CJTF
139. After sixteen months of intensive discus-
sions in many different working groups, task
forces and committees, it has become quite clear
that implementation of the CJTF idea is even
more complicated than it was thought to be at the
moment of its conception. In the following para-
gtaphs, some of the problems encountered will be
reviewed.
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I40. First of all, negotiators have noted that the
notion of joint or multiservice activities, one of
the foundations of CJTF, is not yet widely accept-
ed in the armed forces activities. The fact thatjoint activities are supposed to include mobilisa-
tion, interoperability of on-hand communications
and intelligence, airlift, sealift, transport and
multiservice preparation and planning, shows the
range and complexity of the concept. Notwith-
standing the extended efforts made so far, the
implementation of CJTF is still at a preliminary
stage. Basic elements such as a financial frame-
work and a command and control system for com-
bined andjoint forces and for ground force mis-
sions are still lacking.
l4l. The CJTF concept is still a semi-official
project and until now work has been developing
on this semi-official basis, still awaiting a com-
mand system, control of combined and joint
forces and missions for ground forces. Another
important deficiency in this regard is the lack of a
financial system.
142. Some key allies have diverging views on
the required interface between political and mili-
tary decision-making authorities. In particular, the
level of political control over military operations
to attain a politically decided objective are subject
to discussion.
143. The r6le of SACEUR in CJTF operations is
another vital issue. The European allies would not
like SACEUR, under present arrangements
always a United States General, to have the ulti-
mate military decision-making authority over
CJTF when it operated under WEU. They consi-
der CJTF to be an element to reinforce the Euro-
pean security and defence identity. Ultimate
control by NAIO's SACEUR would in fact subor-
dinate WEU operations with CJTF to United
States control and considerably limit Europe's
opportunities to conduct military operations inde-
pendently.
144. The United States, however, will never
allow its own assets, or those of the alliance, to be
used in a non-NAIO CJTF framework without the
possibility of exerting control. Nor will the United
States allow any infringement of NATO's inte-
grated military structure.
145. Will CJTF cause a radical reorganisation of
NATO's integrated military structure? Some
member states, France in particular, seem to take
the view that the creation of CJTF makes little
sense if it not accompanied by a thorough reor-
ganisation of NATO's integrated military structure
and a flexible system to provide those assets need-
ed for operations under European command.
Others, in particular Denmark and the United
Kingdom, have made it clear that CJTF should
not lead to any infringement of NAIO's integra-
ted military structure and command, which they
regard as a guarantee of United States military
presence in Europe and a prerequisite for the
continuation of the transatlantic link.
146. If the allies succeed in establishing CJTF
which are substantial enough to provide Euro-
pean-led operations with the assets which at pre-
sent are missing in the European inventory, such
as satellite intelligence, logistics and strategic air-
lift, the question will arise as to whether this
might not diminish the incentive for Europeans to
develop and acquire their own independent strate-
gic assets. In other words, CJTF intended to rein-
force the European security and defence identity,
could ultimately result in weakening it.
I47. For the security and defence of their terri-
tory, Western Europe's NATO member states have
always relied on the strategic assets of the United
States. The development of a European security
and defence identity is meant to enable Europe to
assume greater responsibility in this field. It was
finally endorsed by the United States because it
was, and still is, thought that an economically
strong Europe should also pay for its own defence
and security.
148. The CJTF idea was conceived to fill the
deficiencies in Europe's operational capabilities
and enable European allies to carry out contin-
gency operations should NATO choose not to act.
This is a useful and rational procedure in the pre-
sent times of nansition. It would fail in its purpose
if it led to ultimate United States decision-making
authority over non-Article 5 European contingen-
cy operations. At the same time, it should not
deter European allies from acquiring their own
strategic assets which, in the long term, should
enable them to develop and implement their own
security and defence policy.
XII. Conclusions
I49. Taking into account the many initiatives in
recent years to create bilateral or multilateral
forces and to adapt existing forces to new mis-
sions and structures, there is a clear determina-
tion, especially among WEU member states, to
adapt their forces in order to meet the challenges
of a new security environment.
150. It should be noted, however, that the new
patterns of co-operation are not only the result of
decisions taken in the framework of NATO or
WEU. One othercompulsory reason was, and still
is, that reductions in defence budgets and armed
forces in a number of member states have been so
drastic that there has been no alternative to more
intensive co-operation with other nations if the
effectiveness of what was left of their armed
forces was to be maintained.
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151. At the same time, one cannot avoid feeling
that the overall result of the many different initia-
tives, some bilateral, others tri- or multilateral,
somehow lacks coherence.
152. The implementation of the CJTF concept
decided eighteen months ago, and considered
essential for specific European military contin-
gency operations where NATO chooses not to act,
leaves much to be desired. Negotiations clearly
seem to be at a dead end. The WEU Council
should devote its every effort to urge NAIO to
implement the CJTF concept by the end of 1995.
On the other hand, European allies will have to
realise that, whether the CJTF concept is imple-
mented or not, they will not be able to rely eter-
nally upon others for their security.
153. In the near or more distant future, WEU
should possess in its own right a number of strate-
gic assets, in particular strategic military trans-
port, a satellite observation system and military
headquarters.
I54. Finally, United Nations operations in
Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina have
clearly demonstrated that the United Nations
chain of command, even after recent improve-
ments, is a failure, causing unacceptable risks for
military units involved in such operations.In the
future, European units operating in contingency
situations under the aegis of the United Nations
should rely upon WEU headquarters.
155. Apparently, there is an urgent need to orga-
nise a summit meeting of heads of state and of
government of WEU member states to examine
European security and more particularly the need
to co-ordinate means, policies and multinational
co-operation in order to organise effective joint
defence.
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